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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a simulation of the combat support
mission of a Support Platoon, the organic transport element
of a U. S. Army Tank Battalion. The model utilizes Monte
Carlo techniques to determine ammunition hauling capability
as a function of maintenance and vehicles lost due to enemy
action. These factors are parametrically varied with vehicle
replacement times, alternative numbers of task vehicles,
and the number of round trips per day. Plausible input
parameters are selected and discussed and output is sta-
tistically evaluated by Analysis of Variance and Mean Value
Differential Analysis computer programs. The effects of
the main factors are presented by graphical displays based
on the latter program. A scenario is constructed to describe
operational concepts in a combat zone and to develop a
regression model. Potential uses of this simulation and a
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This thesis presents a simulation of the Support Platoon
of a U. S. Army Tank Battalion. The objectives of this
study are:
1. to develop a logistics model that may be integrated
into a battalion level combat simulation.
2. to estimate transport unit capability in various
conflict scenarios by parametric analysis.
3. to evaluate the simultaneous impact of major factors
which impact on combat support operations and to
quantify their effect.
These objectives outline a substantial goal when con-
sidering the dearth of material available on the operations
of this particular unit. The reason may be that the Support
Platoon is under the direct control of a combat unit and
therefore not catalogued in Army manuals with other trans-
portation units. It has a unique mission in that it provides
all organic logistical support to its combat battalion
except maintenance and medical. Therefore, in developing
the model the author has relied upon a combination of Army
doctrine and analytical tools, as well as personal experience
and military judgment.
A. BACKGROUND
In its quest to develop weapons and tactics and study
the phenomena of the battlefield, the Army has amassed a

library of models which have been invaluable in the deploy-
ment of the most technically oriented armed force in history.
Since World War II, the analytical techniques of researchers
have been used by the military community in an attempt to
properly answer inquiries concerning the rapidly developing
concepts of modern warfare. One would hope that the "acid"
test for the decisions which have been made will never be
required and this, in itself, is the ultimate goal of
ongoing research efforts.
Researchers must be constantly aware of the many aspects
of model development. Ideally, model types need to be adapted
to a particular problem in the search for possible decision
alternatives. The positive and negative aspects of each
research method are carefully weighed and all assumptions
are stated in a forthright manner. Results are presented
in an unbiased format to the decision maker. These key
points highlight, yet oversimplify, an extremely complex
process. These comments will serve as a foundation for the
following paragraphs as the discussion moves from the process
of modelling pure combat into the area of logistics modelling.
The underlying point to be made concerns the scope of
any model. In the process of model development, especially
combat modelling, a fact which must be accepted is that no
model is perfect and certain limitations will exist. Combat
is a complex interaction of many tangible and intangible
variables. Since a model is an abstraction of reality, the

developer will make certain assumptions concerning the
combat process. Generally, limitations on computer time and
capacity will control the amount of enrichment that may be
achieved. As abstraction increases, however, more assump-
tions are generally introduced and this usually leads to
a decrease in realism within the model.
This thesis is concerned with a specific aspect of
logistics in a theater of operations. Logistics is a major
area in the combat process encompassing many critical func-
tions which contribute to the results of any conflict.
Several Army models of significant importance do not con-
sider logistics for various reasons. Generally speaking,
only models which simulate large unit combat are capable of
considering the logistics function.
The simultaneous modelling of logistics and combat is
an extremely difficult task considering the multitude of
diverse functions to be performed. For instance, supply
is concerned with a virtually endless stream of commodities
which support combat units as well as the support units
themselves. Obviously, certain aggregation of these products
must be achieved in a model. Possible categories might
include petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ammunition,
repair parts etc. As a matter of fact, the Army has ten
classes of supply which are readily adaptable to the modelling
requirement of aggregation. Other logistics functions include
maintenance, transportation and medical services. Here

again, the functions are conveniently organized in Army
units within the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and the
Corps Support Command (COSCOM) . Ideally, a good represen-
tation of logistics would include those factors and demon-
strate their impact upon the readiness of units for combat.
Often that impact is measured in terms of days of supply
for a given unit. For example, a unit assigned a supply
status of five days might be considered 100% combat effec-
tive for that duration. Below a certain level, say two days,
a unit would be degraded in some manner so as to reflect a
less than combat ready posture. Up to this point, the
comments have been general and no differentiation has been
made with respect to stochastic simulation versus deterministic
models. In either case, the preceding points apply on a
macro level.
A point has now been reached whereby specifics are appro-
priate. The underlying point of this work is concerned with
logistics at a micro level. Logistical functions have pri-
marily been modelled on a large scale basis, as noted earlier.
The Army has relied on unit capability when planning for
operations. These same measures are also applied to models
used for analysis. Unit capability takes into account the
many variables present in the daily operational environment
in order to measure the mean output expected in the long
term. This thesis suggests that an ongoing review of unit
capability is a worthwhile idea to assure viable planning
factors. One method of verification is to use a computer

simulation model of a given type unit in a Theater of Opera-
tions. This process of verification is readily applied to
logistics units since the MOE ' s of such units are well
defined, understood, and conveniently measurable. This is
not the case with combat units. The basic difference lies
in the nature of the mission. For a combat unit to be
modelled, some information must be available regarding an
opposing force, and assumptions must fill in the void of the
unexpected or the unknown. In a logistical unit, the equip-
ment and personnel dominate mission accomplishment. Any
consideration of enemy action against a logistical unit can
be included as a variable much the same way as maintenance
affects mission performance. The enemy factor is no less
important in a logistical model but it can be treated in a
parametric sense as a variable since the mission of the logis-
tics unit is performance in terms of factors for which
information is well known.
It is appropriate at this point to consider some points
on the framework within which this study was conducted.
The computer simulation is but one mode to view the system.
It offers several advantages to include simplicity, speed,
and flexibility. This thesis is an attempt to highlight the
importance of small unit logistics and bring attention to
the impact of combat losses on a logistics unit. One popu-
lar method of logistics modelling is a computer simulation
designed in gross terms through the employment of network
10

techniques. This method treats commodities as flow similar
to a pipeline whereby the system is controlled through the
manipulation of sources and sinks. It is to be remembered
that each link in a network represents a unit of military
personnel and equipment susceptible to the hazards of the
combat zone. However, the Monte Carlo simulation permits
a relatively close look at the individual elements in the
unit. In short, unit capability should not be treated as a
fixed, well-known constant, but rather a variable, since it
is composed of many other variables existing in the environ-
ment. For many reasons most combat models do not and cannot
fully incorporate the impact of the logistics factor. Often,
it is treated quite superficially. This thesis offers an
alternative which could be inserted as a subroutine in
larger models to control the maximum combat potential of
a combat unit by simulating the movement of each supply
load. The program is relatively compact and parameters can
be varied to coincide with scenario specifications.
The previous discussion has outlined a motivation for
the model to be developed in this thesis. Small unit logis-
tics is a relatively simple operation to model since
logistics units are by their nature specialized. Variables
which impact on the system can be varied parametrically
and the output is a valuable source of input to combat models
or other logistics models. Degradation of unit capability
through the application of probabilistic combat factors will
essentially "worst case" the accomplishment of unit mission.
11

B. SUPPORT OF A TANK BATTALION
The introduction of tank warfare during World War I
dramatically changed the methods of war in terms of mobility
and firepower. Those with the foresight to recognize its
potential were quick to admit that a change in combat doc-
trine can only be successful with a corresponding change in
logistics doctrine. Added mobility meant unprecedented fuel
requirements and mechanical repair capability. Greater
firepower demanded ammunition in seemingly astronomical
quantities. American military stagnation between the wars
was highlighted by the refusal to accept this progressive
form of cavalry to replace the horse. On the other hand,
German "blitzkrieg" tactics included planning for the necessary
logistic support of mobile cavalry with the result that only
the weather stemmed the tide of the Nazi armored onslaught
in Russia in 1941. The United States finally developed the
art of tank warfare but Patton's offensive of 1944 was de-
layed for lack of supply. Even the all out logistical
effort of the famed Red Ball Express could not sustain the
momentum. In recent years, the logistical system has modernized
and has demonstrated a unique capability to perform a multi-
tude of intricate support tasks. With these thoughts in
mind, the discussion turns to the challenges of the future.
Within every mechanized division, the U. S. Army has
assigned several Tank Battalions each equipped with 54 M-60
series tanks. Each tank carries approximately 63 rounds of
105mm ammunition of several types which is referred to as the
12

stowed load. Additionally, the basic load includes .50
caliber and 7.62mm machine gun ammunition. Other weapons
in the battalion include Redeye missiles, 4.2 inch mortars,
20mm cannons, and small arms.
The Tank Battalion is 100% mobile. The large weapon
systems noted above are mounted primarily on tracked vehicles.
Most of the vehicles, tracked as well as wheeled, operate
on diesel fuel. A tank battalion operating in a tactical
environment consumes large quantities of fuel, oil, and
lubricants entailing major support requirements.
The organic logistical element of a tank battalion is
the Support Platoon. This unit is the vital link between
the combat unit and a worldwide logistical support system
developed by the Department of Defense. The S-4 Staff Supply
Officer monitors the activities of the Support Platoon and
is responsible for the preparation and execution of the
Logistics Plan of the unit. In a combat environment the
platoon operates from the battalion Field Trains located
directly behind the combat elements. From this position,
the platoon shuttles supplies from Division and Corp level
supply points to the combat units.
In order to support the fuel requirements of the battalion,
at least five of the platoon's vehicles have fuel pods
mounted on them. These trucks are then dispatched on a
temporary basis to the company and battalion Combat Trains
areas for fuel support. Of course, the pods are placed on
13

another truck in the event of a breakdown, if the time to
repair the vehicle would be excessive.
Ammunition is issued by Corps from an Ammunition Supply
Point (ASP) located in the Division Rear area. The receiving
unit is responsible for loading the ammunition, and in
practice an extra truck is utilized for troop transport to
and from the ASP on a daily basis. Ammunition for the 105mm
main gun on a tank is packaged two rounds per box which weighs
approximately 150 pounds. Ideally, four men are used to
load a truck. If ammunition is loaded properly, a good team
can load approximately 100 boxes in less than one hour.
However, this pace is difficult to maintain.
Vehicles are committed to a multitude of other tasks
in their support role. Delivery of general supplies requi-
sitioned through the Division Supply Office, movement of
equipment and reserve supplies, adminstrative troop trans-
port, and support of the field mess operations are but a
few. All requests for transportation are approved by the
battalion Operations Section and coordinated with the S-4
Officer. Any drastic change in the support platoon's capa-
bility may require additional assistance from the Division
Motor Transport Company. That unit is equipped with the
larger tractor-trailer combination vehicles, but the unit
mission prohibits movement of ammunition. Herein lies the
importance of the Support Platoon in its direct support role.
A final, important aspect of the operation of the platoon
concerns convoy operations. The purpose of a convoy is to
14

provide control and security for the movement of cargo. As
with any military operation, convoys must be well planned
and executed to insure mission accomplishment. Convoy
discipline requires that drivers are aware of operating pro-
cedures and instructed in actions to be taken in the event
of emergency. Drivers must be experienced since no radios
are installed in trucks. Speed and spacing appropriate for
the terrain, weather, and tactical situation are critical
elements in an orderly movement. In the event of ambush,
drivers must respond quickly. If caught in a kill zone,
vehicles must exit the area as quickly as possible. In
short, convoy operations involve more than just driving.
15

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
A. OVERVIEW
The model simulates the operation of the Support
Platoon described in the previous section. Performance
of the unit is determined by the total number of vehicles
which successfully deliver ammunition during a predetermined
period of time. The unit commences operation with a certain
number of vehicles to perform its mission. Each vehicle
is evaluated with regard to its availability for a given
day. If a vehicle is operational, it performs a round trip
from the combat unit to the Ammunition Supply Point. A
maximum of three trips may be made each day. Upon comple-
tion of a trip, another maintenance evaluation may be made.
During a trip, all vehicles in a convoy may be subjected
to an ambush. Each vehicle is then evaluated regarding its
survivability. For each vehicle lost due to combat, a
replacement is added to the unit after a certain delay.
This short outline will be expanded in the following sections
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Logistics operations are continuous and repetitive.
Support systems are designed to process routine actions.
Unusual requirements normally burden a system, yet cause
it to demonstrate its flexibility. For modelling purposes,
the initial assumptions limit the scope of the model to the
critical functions of the system. In other words, the
16

simulation of fundamental activities of the mission should
be the basic design of the model. Special requirements may
be designed into a model as subroutines, but it may be
difficult in many systems to determine exactly what these
are. Such is the case with this model.
The model assumes that the Support Platoon supports a
"pure" tank battalion. In actual operations, the supported
unit would probably be a task force, consisting of two tank
companies and one infantry company rather than three tank
companies. This cross attachment reflects the combined arms
concept for operations in a conventional war, which calls
for a tank battalion to trade one company with an infantry
battalion. However, the support platoon of the infantry
battalion would provide the same support to the attached
tank company. The model merely aggregates that support in
terms of the tank battalion. The output capability of the
Support Platoon measured in truckloads remains the same
regardless of the units it supports.
The model assumes that drivers are always available.
Administrative and combat losses are not included as a
limiting factor. In one sense, this assumption is reason-
able, since other personnel in the battalion could function
as drivers if required. However, the pool of experienced
drivers would be limited.
In the determination of the parameter which establishes
the initial number of trucks available for the ammunition
transport mission, several assumptions have been made. All
17

vehicles that are not utilized for fuel or ammunition are
combined into one category. This category includes non-
operational fuel trucks and trucks assigned to other missions.
Throughout any single execution of the model, this value
remains constant. This is reasonable since most drivers and
their respective vehicles may often be dedicated to a par-
ticular mission. Increased efficiency results when a driver
becomes familiar with hauling over the same route. The
assumption is that the number and type of mission tasks
remain consistent from day to day. Therefore, the maximum
number of trucks assigned to the ammunition mission remains
fixed. Degradation of unit capability is assessed only for
ammunition carrying vehicles. Reduction of non-ammunition
vehicles is fixed in the constant mentioned above. In
this regard, it would appear that the model places priority
truck assignment on missions other than that of ammunition.
This is not quite true, since a subjective value based on
experience is given to the constants mentioned above. Also,
the model is capable of ranging over all possible values in
order to indicate an expected value.
Several assumptions have been required concerning the
ambush. All vehicles are assumed to be susceptible to enemy
fire. The long range of weapons and the possible variations
regarding terrain have necessitated that those effects be
factored into the probability of kill parameter. Also, the
length of convoys does not impact on this parameter. Longer
convoys would realistically isolate certain vehicles from

the kill zone. However, the kill zone size is actually a
function of the size of the enemy force. Other complexities
in the parameter determination result from the fact that
vehicle speeds increase immediately after the initial firings,
so one would expect the probability of kill to decrease with
time. The model only considers one degree of "kill". Partial
damage and cargo salvage are not modelled. This assumption
is based on the high degree of vulnerability of an unarmed,
wheeled vehicle. The occurrence of an ambush does not cur-
tail operations for the day if other trips are planned. In
reality, certain delays for reorganization and recovery may
occur.
C. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
A Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is a performance cri-
teria upon which analysis is performed. It is a measured
output, which reflects the ability of a system to function
in a given environment. The MOE must measure system effec-
tiveness in order for the analyst to quantify and evaluate
current and/or potential capability.
Several MOE ' s may represent the operational capability
of a system. Some may be preferable on an economic basis
when data collection is involved. Certainly, an MOE may be
a mathematical combination of two or more other MOE ' s
.
The researcher or analyst must be wary, however, to prevent
the introduction of bias through poor selection of an MOE.
During the process of model development, it is important to
1 q

perform a study of the possible MOE ' s and systematically
determine the most appropriate through a decision making
process.
In an operational environment. Army motor transport
units are rated by daily tonnage capability. Usually this
capacity is given for both short haul and long haul m.ovements
.
The distinction is a function of the number of round trips
per day, a short haul usually indicating more than one round
trip per day. When reporting on the results of an operation,
data is often presented in units of ton-miles (ton-kilometers)
.
This MOE combination may be misleading if for no other reason
than its usually high value. The preferred MOE should be
one which indicates the cargo classes which have been trans-
ported.
Since the primary area of interest of this study con-
cerns only ammunition transport, the MOE selected is simply
truck loads moved during a period of time. The time periods
selected are points of analysis at three, five, fifteen
and thirty days. These time periods are considered suffi-
cient and appropriate to estimate transport capability for
the crucial initial period of a European style conflict.
No attempt is made in this thesis to estimate quantities
of ammunition in terms of total rounds by type. The model
functions independently of both the supply in the logistics
system and the demand created by the combat unit. Since
this thesis is concerned with capability, the selected MOE
offers estimates which are easily understood. For any given

scenario, planners might determine whether sufficient capa-
bility exists to meet a demand for ammunition. Fluctuations
in combat intensity will vary this demand and thereby
indicate the need to augment (or decrease) the capability
for the long term.
D. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
This section presents the model as a mathematical
function to be analyzed by classical statistical methods.
Procedures of this type, including the Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) , require several assumptions which are briefly
stated.
This thesis proposes that the Measure of Effectiveness
(MOE) , total truckloads delivered, is determined by the
additive effects of the following main factors:
1. maximum number of trucks available
2. maintenance down time
3. loss of vehicles due to ambush
4. ability of the enemy to interdict the supply route
5. enemy proficiency in the destruction of convoy targets
6. time to replace lost vehicles
In order to investigate the model and determine the
simultaneous effect of all factors, a completely crossed or
full factorial design was peformed. Notationally , the model
appears as Appendix A.





1. residual degrees of freedom increase rapidly with
the addition of each level of a factor, thereby
increasing the efficiency and sensitivity of the
design.
2. the design provides the opportunity to observe the
impact of any interaction effects.
3. where no prior knowledge about the underlying popu-
lation exists, the factorial offers a flexible means
of testing hypothesis and estimating parameters.
In order to limit the complexity of the model and be
compatible with analysis programs, the following four factors



























In classical analysis the "best" estimates of the
parameters are determined by the Method of Least Squares
The adjective "best" implies that the factor estimates








minimum mean square error
The cost to insure these properties may be measured by the
significance of the assumptions that accompany the theoreti-





2. E[e. ] = o1
3. E[e^,e.] = , i t^ j .
The interpretation of the symbology is that the experimental
errors are distributed with mean zero and common variance
over all observations. Furthermore, the errors are uncorre-
lated. Independence is maintained by controlling the
numerical seed values read into the computer. The string
of random numbers drawn by the computer for Monte Carlo
purposes is segmented so that each replication uses a
separate portion of the same string. This breakdown




The accuracy of the model is governed by the number of
replications of the experiment. For purposes of this work,
five iterations of thirty-six parameter sets have been run.
Analysis is undertaken at four points in time. A more
detailed study would include hundreds of replications and
daily points of analysis in the hope of achieving steady
state stability with low error variance.
The following sections describe the results by first
presenting all values of the MOE, truckloads delivered,
at Appendix B. For each analysis point there are 108 values
listed with the numerical levels of each of four factors.
Recall that two of the original six factors are held con-
stant at one level. They are the probability of kill against
a given vehicle and the probability of nonoperational status
for a vehicle. Essentially, the impact of these factors,
E and F, has been combined into y, the overall mean.
The reduced model for analysis is notationally similar
to the full six factor model and is also presented as
Appendix A.
A. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
was utilized for computation of the classical Analysis of
Variance. All results from the ANOVA's are located at
Appendix C. SPSS runs are presented for each of the four
analysis points.

At the three day point, the effect of the replacement
time (REPL) is not statistically significant. This is to
be expected since no vehicles could arrive as replacements
until at least three full days have elapsed after the loss
occurred. The effects of the other three factors are highly
significant. The two way interactions are significant as
a group but are primarily influenced by a single two way
interaction. The two way interaction between ambush proba-
bility and the number of trips (BUSH x TRIP) is apparently
responsible as the driving factor. The null hypothesis
pertaining to the main factor REPL (A) is:
H : A = , and alternatively
E^: A 7^ .
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the conclusion
is that the replacement time does not have an effect on
the MOE. The test for the interaction of TRIP and BUSH
(BC) is:
H : (BC) = , and
o
H : (BC) 7^ .
The interpretation is that the combined effect of the number
of trips and the probability of ambush are jointly non-zero.
It is concluded that the model is sensitive to a change in
25

a given combination of the levels of these factors. The
underlying reason could probably be attributed to the expected
50% reduction of vehicles when ambushed. That impact on
the highly significant number of trips may account for
their joint significance. The three way interactions are
significant as a group primarily influenced by the combina-
tion of TRIP, REPL and BUSH but the interpretation is
unclear so no attempt will be made.
The Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) confirms the
above results by depicting the numerical value of the mean
and the main factor effects. Not surprisingly, the effect
of replacement time has low value of only 0.14 truckloads
.
The multiple R-squared, a measure of the variation in the
MOE explained by the model, has a value of 0.608. This is
considered good performance considering the randomness and
multitude of Monte Carlo draws as well as the small sample
size. The multiple-R, a measure of the correlation between
the predicted MOE and the true MOE, is a respectable 0.779.
Since the main factors INUM and TRIP each have three
levels, the rejection of the null hypothesis, H : C =
and H : D = , does not indicate which levels of each
o
factor are significantly different in their effects.
Therefore, a one way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used
to test the hypotheses:
26

H : C, are all equal k = 1, 2, 3
H,
:
C, are not all equal,
and
H : D^ are all equal Z = 1, 2, 3
H, D are not all equal.
The ANOVA leads to rejection in both cases and indicates
that the effects are linear when the MOE is plotted against
the levels of each factor. The visual impact of this linearity
will be evident in a later section of the thesis. The con-
servative Scheffe's Test for "a posteriori" contrasts com-
pares all pairwise differences of the three means of both
INUM and TRIP. The existing differences between level 2
(12 trucks) and level 3 (9 trucks) of INUM are not sufficient
to establish that the effects are significantly different.
In the case of TRIP, the means of each level differ signifi-
cantly. The results of the analysis at this point show
the tremendous impact of the number of trips on the MOE.
All comments made above in reference to the three day
analysis point apply directly to the five day analysis point
with minor exceptions. The slight changes in numerical
values do not change the conclusions reached. The only
change refers to the Scheffe procedure for the difference
in the means of the levels of the factor INUM. The difference
27

between level 1 (15 trucks) and level 2 (12 trucks) is not
statistically significant.
At the third analysis point (15 days) the results indi-
cate some changes from the above. All main effects are
significant, indicating that sufficient time has elapsed
for REPL to become a major contributor to the model. The
two way interactions are collectively significant and the
major influence comes not only from TRIP and BUSH as before,
but also from TRIP and REPL. Three way interactions are
no longer significant. The multiple R-squared has increased
substantially to 0.722. The linearity continues to be strong
among the levels of INUM and TRIP and there is no longer
any homogeneity among their means.
All main factors and most two way interactions are
highly significant at the thirty day point. The multiple
R-squared has increased slightly to its maximum of 0.762.
Approximately, 2 5% of the variation remains unexplained by
the model. It is expected that continued replication would
reduce this figure a great deal. Non-homogeneity of the
means of INUM and TRIP as well as linearity continue to
be prevalent.
Although variance estimates have been high throughout
the analysis, the 95% confidence intervals for the means
of this random effects model have been surprisingly compact.
This may be the result of a good R-squared value. The
strongest effect throughout the analysis appears to be that
of the number of trips. The implication is that the location
o o

of ammunition supply points is a critical decision in the
organization of the combat support scheme.
The following summary of the Analysis of Variance
indicates those effects which are statistically significant
















TRIP X INUMx REPL
TRIP X INUM X BUSH
TRIP X REPL X BUSH
INUM X REPL X BUSH
4-WAY INTERACTIONS
ANALYSIS POINT (DAYS)
3 5 15 30

























* indicates significance at the 0.051 level
X indicates significance at the 0.050 level
The reader's attention is directed to the pattern of the
components which are significant. It should be noted that
the factor TRIP is present in all but one significant
interaction.

B. MEAN VALUE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
This section is based on a very illuminating method of
analysis used to survey the output data. The Mean Value
Differential Analysis (MVDA) program is capable of determining
the mean values of data arranged in any combinatorial order
of factor levels. The output enables the user to view the
effects of two or more factors simultaneously and this is
invaluable in the preparation of graphic results. Some
sample output from the MVDA is located in Appendix C.
Appendix D contains all graphs produced from results of
the MVDA program.
The following tables synthesize the relative performance
of the MOE by ranking each parametric case for a given
figure. The mode of the ranks is then assigned to each
case. The significance of the asterisk will be made clear
in the discussion.
TABLE 1. Ranking of Parametric Cases of Figures 1-6





TIME (DAYS) 1 2
FIGURE
3 4 5 6
MODE OF
RANKS
A 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
B 2 3 2* 4 3 2 2 2 2
C 3 3 1* 1* 1 1* 1 1 1
D 1 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
E 2 8 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
F 3 8 3* 2* 2 3 3 3 3
NOTE: Lower ranks are associated with higher MOE values
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TABLE 2. Ranking of Parametric Cases of Figures 7-12
(MOE at 30 Days)
MAX. VEHICLES REPLACEMENT FIGURE ^^^^ ^p







1 1* 1* 1 1 1* 1
2 2 3* 2 3 3 2,3
3 4 2* 3 2 2 2
4 3 4* 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 4 4 4 4,5
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
TABLE 3. Ranking of Parametric Cases of Figures 13 - 16
(MOE at 30 Days)
CASE






























































TABLE 4. Ranking of Parametric Cases of Figures 17 - 22
(MOE at 30 Days)
MAX. VEHICLES







FIGURE >,^r>^ ^r.MODE OF

























TABLE 5. Ranking of Parametric Cases of Figures 23 - 28
(MOE at 30 Days)
NO. OF FIGURE MODE OF
CASE P (AMBUSH) TRIPS 23 24 25 26 27 28 RANKS
A 0.1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
B 0.1 2 3* 3 2 2 2 2 2
C 0.1 3 1* 1* 1 1* 1* 1 1
D 0.2 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
E 0.2 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
F 0.2 3 2* 2 3 3 4 3 3
32

Generally speaking the results offer no surprises. The
more favorable parameter combinations produce better values
of the MOE. Throughout the analysis, the message is clear
that one trip per day produces poor ammunition resupply. It
is appropriate to establish a standard to differentiate those
parametric combinations which produce a certain desired
level of performance. A realistic value is the daily
delivery of one stowed load per tank. As a reference point,
consider that 510 total truckloads are required in a thirty-
day period to insure an average daily resupply of one stowed
load per tank. Those cases which produce this amount are so
indicated in the tables by an asterisk. Of the thirty-six
parametric combinations only six produce the one basic load




„^ ^^ REPLACEMENT t. / 7^AyrtDT^ctI^ ^^^^ • VEHICLES- 0^ TIME (DAYS) P(AMBUSH) AVAILABLE
3 3 0.1 15
3 3 0.1 12
3 3 0.2 15
2 3 0.1 15
3 8 0.1 15
3 , 8 0.1 12*
The operational conditions required to meet the benchmark
are clearly those which are somewhat ideal. Only one of
the above combinations contains a pair of less than ideal
33

parameter values and is so indicated by an asterisk. In
four of the above cases, a single parameter value which is
less than ideal requires the other three in that combination
to be favorable. The obvious conclusion is that continuous
resupply requires a minimum of enemy harassment. Almost
all vehicles in the unit must be dedicated to ammunition
resupply and they must make as many daily trips as possible.
Lastly, the unit must receive replacements within a short
time of their loss. The impact of any negative influence on
the mission must be minimized or prevented.
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IV. UTILIZATION OF THE MODEL
A. CONCEPT
The analysis of output data generated by the model may
provide certain insights to a "real world" situation. However,
the data is so voluminous that one may lose sight of what the
"bottom line" actually is. In order to overcome this possi-
bility, it is useful to propose a scenario within which the
model may generate typical values applicable to a realistic
situation. In this manner, the reader will associate plau-
sible numerical parameters and output with an operational
system governed by current Army Doctrine. This approach should
clarify several concepts for those uninitiated to Army combat
logistics. The following scenario is generally regarded as
plausible in open literature, although fictitious units and
dates are assumed.
B. SCENARIO
During the mid-1980 's, international tensions mounted to
an unprecedented level due to many political and economic
factors. The stress point was central Europe where negotia-
tions for a reunified Germany had finally broken down. The
Warsaw Pact nations, pressed by East German demands for mili-
tary action, launched a surprise attack to force reunifica-
tion. NATO forces reeled under the thrust at their center
but were able to hold key terrain due to the fact that the
Soviet forces altered their doctrine of mass in order to
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achieve complete surprise. The impact of superior NATO air
power forced a somewhat stable front line inside West Germany.
Tactical nuclear weapons were not employed, although their
potential use dictated dispersion of units. This dispersion
created gaps permitting small unit probes along the line.
Logistical units were fully committed in the execution of
their vital missions as well as coping with enemy harassment
by air, artillery, and infiltration.
The 6th Armored Division (US) , located at a strategically
important point in the line, was taking advantage of the lull
in order to rearm. Typical of its many units, the 1st
Battalion, 39th Armor, was being subjected to enemy harassment
of its supply line. Combat units were stretched thin and
logistical efforts were hampered in their resupply efforts.
The Support Platoon of the battalion was primarily concerned
with moving 105-mm tank ammunition from the Ammunition Supply
Point (ASP) located in the Division Rear Area, a distance of
approximately 50km. In order to build up ammunition levels,
vehicles of the unit were expected to make three round trips
on a daily basis for the next ten days.
The unit was equipped with tactical trucks rated at a
five ton capacity. Twenty of these vehicles are authorized
in the platoon. Five trucks were generally allocated to the
fuel support mission on a permanent basis. Other supply and
administrative requirements often further reduced the vehicles
available for the transport of ammunition. The support mission
was also degraded by maintenance down-time associated with
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continuous and intense operational requirements. Finally,
enemy infiltration of squads equipped with anti-tank weapons
had given rise to the threat of interdiction along the main
supply route. The direct result of this threat was loss of
capability due to the time required for replacement of
vehicles which were destroyed by enemy ambush.
For the next 3 days, planners anticipated a dynamic
tactical situation which would alter the impact of the above
mentioned factors. The battalion commander desired data on
the amount of ammunition he could expect based on current and
projected conditions.
C. DISCUSSION OF INPUT PARAMETERS
Based on a projected 30-day period of conflict, the
following parameters are variable as input to the model:
1. Probability of ambush occurrence
2. Probability of vehicle non-operation
3
.
Number of trips per day
4. Initial number of vehicles available for ammunition
resupply mission
5. Probability of vehicle destruction by the ambush force
6. Replacement rate for destroyed vehicles.
The first three parameters are variable on a daily basis
in order to reflect changing conditions in the tactical situ-
ation. The following discussion will attempt to fit reasonable




The occurrence of an ambush is probably the most difficult
estimate to make. As mentioned earlier, some information
regarding the enemy force must be available. Much of this is
obtained as a judgment of the enemy capability, his expected
mission and objective, and other lesser known factors con-
cerning his style and degree of aggressiveness. Certain
assumptions along these lines are necessary in order to
evaluate enemy intentions. For the scenario, three levels of
ambush probability will be utilized, each for a ten-day period.
Considering that the initial period is stable, a somewhat high
value of 0.35 will be utilized. As the enemy prepares for
intensified combat action in resuming the offensive, forces
will be more concerned with direct confrontation than infiltra-
tion. Therefore, values of 0.25 and 0.10 will be applied to
the second and third ten-day periods respectively. It should
be noted that the declining character of this parameter is due
to the manner in which the scenario was constructed. If the
scenario had been developed around the initial attack and
breakthrough, then one could present arguments for an increasing
ambush probability.
In order to introduce the maintenance factor into the
scenario, a judgment must be made on the parameter relative to
a combat situation. Army references generally dictate that
commanders plan for a 75% availability rate. This figure
indicates that of all vehicles authorized, the commander may
expect to have three-fourths available to be utilized as task
vehicles for mission performance. The degradation is due to
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all causes in this case. Vehicles that would have been
considered non-operational due to maintenance in a peacetime
environment will often be utilized in a combat situation.
Generally, only the most serious maintenance deficiencies
will cause non-availability of any particular vehicle. For
example, any vehicle fuel leak in a peacetime environment
would be grounds for deadline status. In a combat situation,
minor fuel leaks would probably not deter use of the vehicle.
With these thoughts in mind regarding the scenario, the
initial ten-day period will be assigned a probability of
non-operation of 0.15 since the situation is stable and
maintenance would be emphasized in preparation for an impending
period of active combat. The second and third ten-day periods
will be assigned values of 0.20 and 0.25, respectively. In
order to account for the breakdown of vehicles which have been
dispatched, a 0.05 value for additional maintenance degrada-
tion will be applied after each round trip.
The number of round trips per day is a function of several
factors in the tactical environment. The travel time is
directly related to the distance and vehicle speed. Further-
more, speed is a function of terrain, weather, road conditions,
cargo type and weight, and the traffic density including the
length of the convoy. The terrain in central Europe is
generally hilly. Many four-lane "autobahn" roadways exist
with limited access. However, wartime conditions would
generate a tremendous volume of civilian traffic on these
highways and the resulting congestion would inhibit full
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military utilization. There exists a dense network of narrow
two-lane, hard-surface secondary roads which are generally not
banked and are poorly marked. Travel is generally slow on
these roads due to the high density of small towns with narrow
cobblestone streets. The advantage of these secondary roads
is that they would be difficult to interdict and they offer
many alternate routes between two points. Major highways are
generally well cleared and offer little off-road concealment.
The weather is quite variable with seasonal changes, so very
little can be anticipated for short term scenarios. The
number of trips per day based on military experience may be
determined as follows:
ONE WAY DISTANCE TRIPS PER DAY
160km - 90km 1
50km - 90km 2
less than 50km 3
Admittedly, these values are very sensitive to the changes
in the situation and environment. Nevertheless, they are
reasonable and will serve to demonstrate the potential of
the model as well as the extremes in a scenario.
Several other factors have been integrated into the table.
Although a ten-hour day may be planned for the mission, time
must be included for maintenance of vehicles. Also, drivers
and loading crews require meals and rest periods. A major
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time factor is that of loading and unloading of cargo. Here
again, time is subject to a good deal of variability. It
would not be unreasonable to assume that vehicles must queue
for access to the Ammunition Supply Point since many units
are supported by one source. Documentation preparation and
processing cause further delays as well. For the scenario,
three trips per day will be planned for the first ten-day
period. After the initial attack, combat units have been
compressed against support units. For the second ten-day
period, a factor of two trips per day will be used, since NATO
forces will either advance or support units will relocate
further from the battle area. Similar reasoning will justify
the one trip per day for the final period.
The initial number of vehicles dedicated to the ammunition
mission is an important consideration and must reflect some
judgment about other tasks which "compete" for transportation
assets. The maximum of fifteen trucks is reduced by the sum
of the following:
1. trucks to replace non-operational fuel trucks
2. trucks assigned to non-ammunition supply, administra-
tive transport of troops, and ration delivery
3
.
trucks to replace those in 2 which are nonoperational
for maintenance.
The remainder of the trucks are considered available for
use in the transport of ammunition. These vehicles are reduced
separately by the maintenance factor due to the more severe
operating conditions inherent in the mission. When considering
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trucks included in the three categories above, it is important
to realize that the platoon supports five companies as
follows
:
1. three Tank Companies
2. one Headquarters and Headquarters Company
3. one Combat Support Company.
The figure selected as the initial number of trucks available
is treated as a constant in the model. In effect, it is the
maximum number available on any given day. In reality, of
course, the number is variable but its variance would likely
be low. For the scenario, a value of ten trucks is quite
realistic.
The replacement time is a representation of the capability
of the logistical system in a Theater of Operations to respond
to high priority requisitions for major end items. The
parameter is measured in days and Army regulations outline
shipping objectives depending on the priority of the request.
Of course, the priority would depend on the judgment of the
commander concerning the ability of his unit to perform its
mission without any particular vehicle. Certainly, the number
of vehicles currently on hand in the unit would be a considera-
tion although the model will not perform the decision procedure
on this basis. Transport assets are essential to the success
of any military operation and are a critical element of a
highly mobile force. In the case of the scenario, where
support of an armored unit involves large quantities of ammuni-
tion, the shipping delay for replacements could mean the
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difference in the transport of hundreds of rounds. In
selecting a replacement factor of six days, it is assumed that
many other units have similar demands and this creates a
somewhat lengthy delay in the supply system.
The final parameter to be discussed is the probability of
kill, given an ambush against a vehicle. The selection of
any value for this parameter is open to question. But the
point to be made is that it should be included as a factor in
logistical planning. Logistical units maintain the very life-
line of combat units and it is reasonable to assume that they
are a prime target in the enemy's plan.
Several considerations have led to the selection of 0.6
as a parameter. The enemy is equipped with wire guided anti-
tank missiles. Open literature suggests the weapons may be
reasonably accurate up to 2500 meters. This range permits
the enemy to occupy many excellent positions around and above
a kill zone.
The terrain in central Europe is ideal for ambushes.
Covered hilltops often parallel roads in clear valleys. The
sharp unbanked curves of many secondary roads require vehicles
to slow down considerably and loaded five-ton trucks do not
accelerate quickly. Therefore, a kill zone which includes
several curves offers the enemy ample time to launch the
missiles with accuracy. Narrow secondary roads may be easily
blocked. Ambush doctrine indicates that lead and tail
vehicles are primary targets. Their destruction may force




Another aspect of the ambush concerns the sensitivity of
the cargo. Near misses can often be disastrous for unprotected
vehicles. Armored escorts would be a rare event since combat
vehicles and helicopter resources are required in forward
positions. Hardened vehicles, those with steel plate and
sandbags, reduce the amount of cargo space available and
vehicles with armed troops reduce the cargo capability as well.
Basically, the convoy remains a lucrative and vulnerable
target on the modern battlefield as it has throughout history.
One can expect that any properly executed ambush will generally
favor the attacker.
D. RESULTS
While the scenario and the discussion of its parameters
provide insights into the operational aspects of the combat
mission of the Support Platoon, the data generated offers
additional information for analytical consideration. In fact,
the following analysis format is appropriate for all thirty-
six parameter combinations of the four factor model in
Section III.
The combat losses as a function of the probability of kill
and probability of ambush are quite significant. It is obvious
that a regression model may be proposed in order to determine
the relationship between the MOE and the total losses.
Inclusion of the total nonoperational vehicles as an explana-
tory variable was considered and rejected since multicol-
linearity exists among the variables. The computer output of
the model provides these values on a per day basis.
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Using the scenario parameters, twenty replications of
the simulation were run. The correlation between the MOE
and total losses for thirty days is 0.84.
A plot of the MOE with the independent variable indicates
that a linear fit is probably the most appropriate. Prior
analysis in this thesis indicates this relationship also.
The model is
Y = a + bX + e




The R-squared for the model is 0.705. A t-test confirms the
significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.05 level.
The sample mean of Y is 152.6 truckloads with an unbiased
sample variance of 629.41. The residual variance of the
model is 195.68. As an indicator of the efficiency and
fit of the data, this variance reduction is noteworthy.
The interpretation of the model is that if combat losses
are reduced to the expected number of truckloads delivered
is 303. The 95% confidence interval for this parameter is
254.61 1 a <^ 351.93.
The slope parameter indicates that a one unit reduction
in losses will produce a corresponding 5.41 increase in the
number of truckloads. The implication to the commander is
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that any measure he may undertake to reduce losses will reap
benefits. Five truckloads of 105mm tank ammunition may
amount to 1000 rounds. Of course, these preventive measures
would reduce the parameter values of the scenario but the
slope value removes the estimation problem in deciding what
parametric change is equivalent to a particular measure.
The 95% confidence interval for the slope parameter is:
-5.97 <_ b £ -4.87.
This modelling procedure offers the analyst a simple
method to be used in forecasting and planning. For this data
the 95% confidence interval about the mean is
123.21 1 Y £ 181.99.
At first glance this appears to be wide but it essentially .
means only a 1.9 6 truck per day differential at the extremes.
Recalling the conditions of the scenario, the maximum
possible truckoads during the period is
2 TRIPS PER DAY (AVE) x 30 DAYS x 10 TRUCKS = 600 TRUCKS.
The expected fraction of trucks lost to the enemy on any trip
is a function of ambush and kill parameters:
EXPECTED FRACTION LOST = P (AMBUSH) X P(KIIJL) = (0.15) x (0.6) = 0.09
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Nine percent of 600 truckloads is 54 trucks which are each
lost for the six day replacement time resulting in a total
loss of 324 truckloads. The remaining 276 truckloads is
comparable to the parameter intercept value of 303.27. These
simple calculations lend credibility to the simulation model
as a function of its random numbers.
The analysis of Section III did not include multiple
values for the probability of kill parameter in the four
factor model. Therefore, a check on the sensitivity of the
regression model to this parameter is appropriate. Twenty
additional trials of the scenario parameters using a kill
probability of 0,5 were run. The following information was
calculated for the model:






Confidence intervals for the parameters are:
274.83 1 a <_ 357.25
-5.83 ^ b £ -4.83
The 95% confidence interval for the MOE about the mean is:
152.6 1 Y ^ 207.2
The residual variance of this model is 168.83.

The t-test for comparing the two populations verifies that
the means of the two data sets are statistically different
at the 0.05 level. Concerning the sensitivity of the kill
probability, it should be noted that a 16.7% decrease in
the parameter resulted in a 17.9% increase in the mean of
the MOE. In other words, reducing the parameter by 0.1
corresponds to a 27.3 mean truckload increase.
In summary, simple linear regression using ordinary
least squares theory provides a viable method of forecasting
based on expected loss levels. Further investigation of
data in each of the thirty-six parametric conditions wuld
provide a set of models that could be used for contingency
planning or for input to other models. An important part
of any further study would be to establish the consistency
of the critical slope parameter.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is felt that the objectives of this study have been
achieved, yet closing comments are appropriate in relating
the results to the operational environment. This thesis
highlights the prominent aspects of a typical support
operation and indicates expected results for various
parametric conditions.
Actual data collected during a test could validate the
model. The cost benefit of such a test would have to be
carefully considered in view of time and physical resources
required. In any event, the acknowledgement of the six
factors in the model and their apparent impact dictates
further study. The selection of parameter estimates are
admittedly subject to much discussion. Any credence given
the model reflects the assumption that scenarios of the type
suggested by the parameters are indeed credible.
Simple arithmetic calculations show that the resupply
of one stowed load of 105mm tank ammunition is equivalent
to 34 02 rounds per battalion. The one-time lift capability
of the Support Platoon is 3000 rounds. The proximity of
these figures is not coincidental. The point is that any
outside effect will increase the difference between the two
values. The magnitude of that difference is indicated in
the model results.
Other support activities within the Army may readily
be modelled by methods similar to the one employed here.

Specifically, support of an artillery unit would be a prime
prospect for such modelling considering the bulk of the
ammunition involved. This topic is a potentially lucrative
subject of investigation for a Field Artillery Officer who
is well versed in the intricacies of the fire support mission,
This use of the model could be enhanced by empirical
validation of the parameter estimates such as the probability
of kill during engagements. Possibly a combat simulation
could be developed which would utilize this model as a
subroutine to provide daily quantities of ammunition avail-
able as a parameter. Another potential area of study con-
cerns the ammunition supply point at the other end of the
supply line. Specifically, the modelling of an ASP would
entail supply and demand parameters for Division and higher
levels of organization. Finally, a transportation system
of many different units could be designed to simulate a
Corps level support system. The subject is rich in possi-
bilities and readily adaptable to Monte Carlo simulation.
In essence, the treatment of supply as a random variable
rather than a constant induces the commander to use on-hand
resources wisely. Furthermore, the budgeting of future
resources will become an important tactical decision.
These concepts foster the philosophy that the random effects
of the battlefield environment apply to support units as
well as combat units.
The high statistical significance of the main factors
leads to the conclusion that the military must be capable of
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controlling their influence. The tactical commander
requires adequate organic transport capability in order to
maintain support flexibility. Interdiction of supply
lines must be minimized by controlling access to rear areas.
Failure to achieve this goal will require additional resources
if the supply mission is to be accomplished. Regarding
destroyed capability, the Army must maintain a responsive
supply system to replace lost equipment. Prepositioned
equipment surplus is an expensive option but a certain
amount may be a cost effective solution. Finally, as has
been emphasized throughout this thesis, the optimal location
of supply points is critical. They must be conveniently
located to the user and at the same time they require the
safety of distance from forward areas. It must be remembered
that the displacement of a supply point may temporarily





The model described in this thesis is represented by
a full factorial or fully crossed design. This design
assumes the additivity of the components in the model and
the presence of all factor interactions. The following
equation is the full six factor model:
Y.., = y+A.+B.+C, +D„+E +F„ +i3k£mno ^ i 3 k £ m n
(all two way interactions) + (all three
way interactions) + (all four way interactions)




Y is the truckloads delivered (MOE)
,
y is the overall mean,
A is the effect of the replacement time in days
,
B is the effect of the ambush probability,
C is the effect of the number of trips per day,
D is the effect of the maximum number of vehicles
available per day
E is the effect of the kill probability,




i, j, k, I, m, n, are the various factor levels
and o is the number of replications.
The following equation is the reduced model used in the
computer simulation since two factors were represented with
one level each.
^ijkto = I' + ^i ^ ^j + =k -^ °. -^ <^" ^"° "^y
interactions) + (all three way interactions)
(ABCD) . ., + e . .,




VALUES OF THE MOE
This appendix presents the values of the MOE, truck-
loads delivered, for each of four analysis points. The
first four columns are the levels of each factor as follows:
COLUMN 1: Probability of Ambush
1= 0.1 2=0.2
COLUMN 2: Replacement Time
1=3 days 2=8 days
COLUMN 3; Maximum Number of Vehicles Available per Trip
1=15 trucks 2=12 trucks 3=9 trucks
COLUMN 4 : Number of Trips per Day
1=1 trip 2=2 trips 3=3 trips
Column 5 is the replicate number for the parametric case
and the MOE value is the last column.
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The tables in this appendix contain the Analysis of
Variance, Multiple Classification Analysis, and other
statistical information used in this thesis. Each
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SAMPLE OUTPUT FROM THE MEAN VALUE
DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS (MVDA) PROGRAM
A typical portion of the computer output from the MVDA
program is presented in this appendix. The numerical
designator of each level is consistent with the description
in Appendix B. The sub-mean column refers to the mean of
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This appendix displays the output of the Mean Value
Differential Analysis program in graphic format. The graphs
are grouped such that only two factors are variable on any
one graph while the other two factors are variable within





1-6 Nuirter of Trips per Day
Replaconent Time
Ambush Probability
jyfeximum Number of Vehicles
Available per Trip




Number of Trips per Day
13-16 Number of Trips per Day





































FIGURE 1. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush) = 0.1,

























FIGURE 2. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush) = 0.1,






























FIGURE 3. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush) = 0.1,



































FIGURE 4. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush) = 0.2,
























FIGURE 5. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush



















FIGURE 6. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush) = 0.2,



































FIGURE 7 Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)

























FIGURE 8. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)























FIGURE 9. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)





















FIGURE 10. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)






















FIGURE 11. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)






















FIGURE 12. Truckloads Delivered for P (ambush)







































FIGURE 13. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 3 Days,
P (ambush) = 0.1
l04
























FIGURE 14. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 3 Days,























FIGURE 15. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 8 Days,























FIGURE 16. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 8 Days,
























FIGURE 17. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time
























FIGURE 18. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time
























FIGURE 19. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time






















FIGURE 20. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time





















FIGURE 21. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time






















FIGURE 22. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time























FIGURE 23. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 3 Days,




















Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 3 Days,



















FIGURE 25. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 3 Days,























FIGURE 26. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 8 Days,


























FIGURE 27. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 8 Days,




400^ LINE P (AMBUSH) TRIPS
A 0.1 1
B 0.1 2
g 300 C 0.1 3
1
D 0.2 1
D E 0.2 2




FIGURE 28. Truckloads Delivered for Replacement Time = 8 Days,
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